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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to prove coding theorems for the wiretap channel and secret key agreement based
on the the notion of a hash property for an ensemble of functions. These theorems imply that codes using sparse
matrices can achieve the optimal rate. Furthermore, fixed-rate universal coding theorems for a wiretap channel
and a secret key agreement are also proved.
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Shannon theory, hash property, linear codes, sparse matrix, maximum-likelihood decoding, minimum-divergence
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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this paper is to prove the coding theorems for the wiretap channel (Fig. 1) introduced in [23] and
secret key agreement problem (Fig. 2) introduced in [12][1]. The proof of theorems is based on the notion of a
hash property for an ensemble of functions introduced in [18][19]. This notion provides a sufficient condition for
the achievability of coding theorems. Since an ensemble of sparse matrices has a hash property, we can construct
codes by using sparse matrices where the rate of codes is close to the optimal rate. In the construction of codes,
we use minimum-divergence encoding, maximum-likelihood decoding, and minimum-entropy decoding, where
we can use the approximation methods introduced in [9][5] to realize these operations.
Wiretap channel coding using a sparse matrices is studied in [21] for binary erasure wiretap channels. On the
other hand, our construction can be applied to any stationary memoryless channel. It should be noted here that
the encoder design is based on the standard channel code presented in [14][18][19][13]. Furthermore, we prove
the fixed-rate universal coding theorem for a wiretap channel, where our construction is reliable and secure for
any channel under some conditions specified by the encoding rate. Universality is not considered in [23][21].
J. Muramatsu is with NTT Communication Science Laboratories, NTT Corporation, 2-4, Hikaridai, Seika-cho, Soraku-gun, Kyoto 619-
0237, Japan (E-mail: pure@cslab.kecl.ntt.co.jp). S. Miyake is with NTT Network Innovation Laboratories, NTT Corporation, Midori-cho
3-9-11, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8585, Japan (E-mail: miyake.shigeki@lab.ntt.co.jp).
This paper was presented in part at “Construction of wiretap channel codes by using sparse matrices,” Proc. 2009 IEEE Information
Theory Workshop (ITW2009), Taormina, Italy, pp. 105–109, 2009. This paper is submitted to IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
Feb. 2010.
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Fig. 2. Secret Key Agreement from Correlated Source Outputs
The secret key agreement from correlated source outputs using sparse matrices is studied in [15][16], where
both non-universal and universal codes are considered. Our construction is the same as that proposed in [16].
It should be noted that the linearity of functions is not assumed in our proof of reliability and security while it
is assumed in [16]. Furthermore, an expurgated ensemble of sparse matrices is not assumed in our proof while
it is assumed in [16].
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, we use the following definitions and notations.
The cardinality of a set U is denoted by |U|, Uc denotes the compliment of U , and U \ V ≡ U ∩ Vc.
Column vectors and sequences are denoted in boldface. Let Au denote a value taken by a function A :
Un → U at u ≡ (u1, . . . , un) ∈ Un, where Un is a domain of the function. It should be noted that A may
be nonlinear. When A is a linear function expressed by an l × n matrix, we assume that U is a finite field
and the range of functions is defined by U ≡ U l. It should be noted that this assumption is not essential for
general (nonlinear) functions because discussion is not changed if l log |U| is replaced by log |U |. For a set A
of functions, let ImA be defined as
ImA ≡
⋃
A∈A
{Au : u ∈ Un}.
We define sets CA(c), CAB(c,m), and CABB̂(c,m,w) as
CA(c) ≡ {u : Au = c}
CAB(c,m) ≡ {u : Au = c, Bu =m}
C
ABB̂
(c,m,w) ≡ {u : Au = c, Bu =m, B̂u = w}.
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3In the context of linear codes, CA(c) is call a coset determined by c.
Let p and p′ be probability distributions and let q and q′ be conditional probability distributions. Then entropy
H(p), conditional entropy H(q|p), divergence D(p‖p′), and conditional divergence D(q‖q′|p) are defined as
H(p) ≡
∑
u
p(u) log
1
p(u)
H(q|p) ≡
∑
u,v
q(u|v)p(v) log 1
q(u|v)
D(p ‖ p′) ≡
∑
u
p(u) log
p(u)
p′(u)
D(q ‖ q′|p) ≡
∑
v
p(v)
∑
u
q(u|v) log q(u|v)
q′(u|v) ,
where we assume the base 2 of the logarithm.
Let µUV be the joint probability distribution of random variables U and V . Let µU and µV be the respective
marginal distributions and µU|V be the conditional probability distribution. Then the entropy H(U), the
conditional entropy H(U |V ), and the mutual information I(U ;V ) of random variables are defined as
H(U) ≡ H(µU )
H(U |V ) ≡ H(µU|V |µV )
I(U ;V ) ≡ H(U)−H(U |V ).
Let νu and νu|v be defined as
νu(u) ≡ |{1 ≤ i ≤ n : ui = u}|
n
νu|v(u|v) ≡ νuv(u, v)
νv(v)
.
We call νu a type of u ∈ Un and νu|v a conditional type. Let U ≡ νU be the type of a sequence and
U |V ≡ νU|V be the conditional type of a sequence given a sequence of type U . Then a set of typical sequences
TU and a set of conditionally typical sequences TU|V (v) are defined as
TU ≡ {u : νu = νU}
TU|V (v) ≡
{
u : νu|v = νU|V
}
.
The empirical entropy, the empirical conditional entropy, and empirical mutual information are defined as
H(u) ≡ H(νu)
H(u|v) ≡ H(νu|v|νv)
I(u;v) ≡ H(u)−H(u|v).
A set of typical sequences TU,γ and a set of conditionally typical sequences TU|V,γ(v) are defined as
TU,γ ≡ {u : D(νu‖µU ) < γ}
TU|V,γ(v) ≡
{
u : D(νu|v‖µU|V |νv) < γ
}
.
We use several lemmas for the method of the types described in Appendix.
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4In the construction of codes, we use a minimum-divergence encoder
g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) ≡ arg min
x′∈C
ABB̂
(c,m,w)
D(νx′‖µX), (1)
a maximum-likelihood decoder
gA(c|y) ≡ arg max
x′∈CA(c)
µX|Y (x
′|y), (2)
and a minimum-entropy decoder
g˜A(c|y) ≡ arg min
x′∈CA(c)
H(x′|y). (3)
The minimum-divergence encoder assigns a message to a typical sequence as close as possible to the input
distribution, where the typical sequence is in the coset determined by c. The time complexity of encoding and
decoding is exponential with respect to the block length by using the exhaustive search. It should be noted
that the linear programming method introduced [9] and [5] can be applied to these encoder and decoders by
assuming that X = Y = GF(2) and A, B, and B̂ are linear functions, where the linear programming method
may not find the integral solution. Details are described in Section VIII. It should be noted here that we do not
discuss the performance of the linear programming methods in this paper.
We define χ(·) as
χ(a = b) ≡
1, if a = b0, if a 6= b
χ(a 6= b) ≡
1, if a 6= b0, if a = b.
Finally, we use the following definitions in Appendix. For γ, γ′ > 0, we define
λU ≡ |U| log[n+ 1]
n
(4)
ζU (γ) ≡ γ −
√
2γ log
√
2γ
|U| (5)
ζU|V(γ
′|γ) ≡ γ′ −
√
2γ′ log
√
2γ′
|U||V| +
√
2γ log |U| (6)
ηU (γ) ≡ −
√
2γ log
√
2γ
|U| +
|U| log[n+ 1]
n
(7)
It should be noted here that the product set U × V is denoted by UV when it appears in the subscript of these
functions. We define h(θ) for 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 as
h(θ) ≡ −θ log θ − [1− θ] log(1− θ). (8)
We define | · |+ as
|θ|+ ≡

θ, if θ > 0,
0, if θ ≤ 0.
(9)
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5III. (α,β)-HASH PROPERTY
In the following, we review the notion of the hash property for an ensemble of functions, which is introduced
in [18]. This provides a sufficient condition for coding theorems, where the linearity of functions is not assumed.
We prove coding theorems based on this notion.
Definition 1 ([18]): Let A ≡ {An}∞n=1 be a sequence of sets such that An is a set of functions A : Un →
UAn satisfying
lim
n→∞
log
|UAn |
|ImAn|
n
= 0. (H1)
For a probability distribution pA,n on An, we call a sequence (A,pA) ≡ {(An, pA,n)}∞n=1 an ensemble. Then,
(A,pA) has an (αA,βA)-hash property if there are two sequences αA ≡ {αA(n)}∞n=1 and βA ≡ {βA(n)}∞n=1
such that
lim
n→∞
αA(n) = 1 (H2)
lim
n→∞
βA(n) = 0 (H3)
and ∑
u∈T
u
′∈T ′
pA,n ({A : Au = Au′}) ≤ |T ∩ T ′|+ |T ||T
′|αA(n)
|ImAn| +min{|T |, |T
′|}βA(n) (H4)
for any T , T ′ ⊂ Un. Throughout this paper, we omit dependence of A, pA, αA and βA on n.
In the following, we present two examples of ensembles that have a hash property.
Example 1: In this example, we consider a universal class of hash functions introduced in [8]. A set A of
functions A : Un → UA is called a universal class of hash functions if
| {A : Au = Au′} | ≤ |A||UA|
for any u 6= u′. For example, the set of all functions on Un and the set of all linear functions A : Un → U lA
are classes of universal hash functions (see [8]). When A is a universal class of hash functions and pA is the
uniform distribution on A, we have∑
u∈T
u
′∈T ′
pA ({A : Au = Au′}) ≤ |T ∩ T ′|+ |T ||T
′|
|ImA| .
This implies that (A,pA) has a (1,0)-hash property, where 1(n) ≡ 1 and 0(n) ≡ 0 for every n.
Example 2: In this example, we consider a set of linear functions A : Un → U lA . It was discussed in the
above example that the uniform distribution on the set of all linear functions has a (1,0)-hash property. In the
following, we introduce the ensemble of q-ary sparse matrices proposed in [18]. Let U ≡ GF(q) and lA ≡ nR
for given 0 < R < 1. We generate an lA × n matrix A with the following procedure, where at most τ random
nonzero elements are introduced in every row.
1) Start from an all-zero matrix.
2) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, repeat the following procedure τ times:
a) Choose (j, a) ∈ {1, . . . , lA} ×GF(q) uniformly at random.
b) Add a to the (j, i) component of A.
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6Let (A,pA) be an ensemble corresponding to the above procedure, where τ = O(log lA) is even. It is proved
in [18, Theorem 2] that there is (αA,βA) such that (A,pA) has an (αA,βA)-hash property.
In the following, let A be a set of functions A : Un → UA and assume that pC is the uniform distribution
on ImA, and random variables A and C are mutually independent, that is,
pC(c) =

1
|ImA| , if c ∈ ImA
0, if c ∈ UA \ ImA
pAC(A, c) = pA(A)pC(c)
for any A and c. We have the following lemmas, where it is not necessary to assume the linearity of functions.
Lemma 1 ([18, Lemma 1]): If (A, pA) satisfies (H4), then
pA ({A : [G \ {u}] ∩ CA(Au) 6= ∅}) ≤ |G|αA|ImA| + βA
for all G ⊂ Un and all u ∈ Un.
Lemma 2 ([18, Lemma 2]): If (A, pA) satisfies (H4), then
pAC ({(A, c) : T ∩ CA(c) = ∅}) ≤ αA − 1 + |ImA| [βA + 1]|T |
for all T 6= ∅.
Finally, we consider the independent joint ensemble pAB of linear matrices. The following lemma asserts that
it is sufficient to assume the hash property of (A,pA) and (B,pB) to satisfy the hash property of (A×B,pAB)
when they are ensembles of linear matrices.
Lemma 3 ([18, Lemma 7]): For two ensembles (A,pA) and (B,pB), of lA×n and lB×n linear matrices,
respectively, let pAB be the joint distribution defined as
pAB(A,B) ≡ pA(A)pB(B).
Then (A ×B,pAB) has an (αAB,βAB)-hash property for the ensemble of functions A⊕B : Un → U lA+lB
defined as
A⊕B(u) ≡ (Au, Bu),
where
αAB(n) = αA(n)αB(n)
βAB(n) = βA(n) + βB(n).
IV. WIRETAP CHANNEL CODING
In this section we consider the wiretap channel coding problem illustrated in Fig. 1, where no common
message and perfect secrecy are assumed. A wiretap channel is characterized by the conditional probability
distribution µY Z|X , where X , Y , and Z are random variables corresponding to the channel input of a sender,
the channel output of a legitimate receiver and the channel output of an eavesdropper. Then the capacity1 of
1 It is stated in [20] that the auxiliary random variable can be eliminated by applying [10, Theorem 7] and [11, Theorem 3]. In fact,
because of the authors misunderstanding about the result of [11, Theorem 3], the statement of [20] may not be true. They wish to thank
Prof. Shamai (Shitz), Prof. Oohama, and Prof. Koga, for helpful discussions.
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Fig. 3. Construction of Wiretap Channel Code
this channel is derived in [7, Eq. (11)] as
Capacity ≡ max
X̂,X:
X̂↔X↔Y Z
[
I(X̂ ;Y )− I(X̂ ;Z)
]
, (10)
where the maximum is taken over all probability distribution µ
X̂X
and the joint distribution µ
X̂XY Z
is given
by
µ
X̂XY Z
(x̂, x, y, z) ≡ µY Z|X(y, z|x)µX̂X(x̂, x). (11)
If a channel between X and Y is more capable than a channel between X and Z , that is,
I(X ;Y ) ≥ I(X ;Z)
is satisfied for every input X , then the capacity of this channel is simplified as
Capacity ≡ max
X
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] , (12)
where the maximum is taken over all random variables X and the joint distribution of random variable (X,Y, Z)
is given by
µXY Z(x, y, z) ≡ µY Z|X(y, z|x)µX(x). (13)
This capacity formula is derived in [23] for a degraded broadcast channel, extended in [7] to the case where a
channel between X and Y is more capable than a channel between X and Z .
In the following, we assume that µX and µY Z|X are given, where it is not necessary to assume that a channel
is degraded or a channel between X and Y is more capable than that between X and Z . We fix functions
A : Xn → X lA
B : Xn → X lB
B̂ : Xn → X lB̂
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8and a vector c ∈ X lA available for an encoder, a decoder, and an eavesdropper, where
lA ≡ n[H(X |Y ) + εA]
log |X |
lB ≡ n[H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )]
log |X |
=
n[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]
log |X |
lB̂ ≡
n[I(X ;Z)− εB̂]
log |X | .
We construct a stochastic encoder and assume that the encoder uses a random sequence w ∈ X lB̂ , which is
generated uniformly at random and independently of the channel and the message m ∈ X lB . We define the
encoder and the decoder
ϕ : X lB × X lB̂ → Xn
ϕ−1 : Yn → X lB
as
ϕ(m,w) ≡ g
ABB̂
(c,m,w)
ϕ−1(y) ≡ BgA(c|y),
where g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) and gA(c|y) are defined by (1) and (2), respectively. It is noted that gABB̂ is a
deterministic map.
Let M and W be random variables corresponding to m and w, respectively, where the probability distribu-
tions pM and pW are given by
pM (m) ≡

1
|ImB| if m ∈ ImB
0, if m /∈ ImB
(14)
pW (w) ≡

1
|ImB̂|
if w ∈ ImB̂
0, if w /∈ ImB̂
(15)
and the joint distribution pMWY Z of the messages, and the channel outputs is given by
pMWY Z(m,w,y, z) ≡ µY Z|X(y, z|ϕ(m,w))pM (m)pW (w).
The rate of this code is given by
Rate ≡ log |ImB|
n
= I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)−
log |X |
lB
|ImB|
n
which converges to I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) as n goes to infinity by assuming the condition (H1) for an ensemble
(B, pB). The decoding error probability ErrorY |X(A,B, B̂, c) is given by
ErrorY |X(A,B, B̂, c) ≡
∑
m,w,y
µY |X(y|ϕ(m,w))pM (m)pW (w)χ(ϕ−1(y) 6=m). (16)
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9The information leakage LeakageZ|X(A,B, B̂, c) is given by
LeakageZ|X(A,B, B̂, c) ≡
I(M ;Zn)
n
. (17)
It should be noted that the vector c is considered to be part of a deterministic map, which is known by the
eavesdropper.
We have the following theorem. It should be noted that alphabets X and Y is allowed to be non-binary, and
the channel is allowed to be asymmetric, non-degraded.
Theorem 1: Let µY Z|X be the conditional probability distribution of a stationary memoryless channel. For
given lA and lB, assume that ensembles (A,pA), (A×B,pAB), and (A×B×B̂,pABB̂) have a hash property.
Then for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there are εB̂ > εA > 0, functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A,
B ∈ B, B̂ ∈ B̂, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
Rate > I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− δ (18)
ErrorY |X(A,B, B̂, c) < δ (19)
LeakageZ|X(A,B, B̂, c) < δ. (20)
By assuming that the channel between X and Y is more capable than that between X and Z , µX attains the
secrecy capacity defined by (12), and δ → 0, the rate of the proposed code is close to the secrecy capacity.
For a general wiretap channel µY Z|X , let F : X̂ → X be a channel (non-deterministic map) corresponding
to a conditional probability distribution µ
X|X̂ and assume that
µ
X̂X
(x̂, x) ≡ µ
X|X̂(x|x̂)µX̂(x̂)
achieves the maximum of the right hand side of (10). By using a proposed code for the channel µ
Y Z|X̂ defined
as
µ
Y Z|X̂(y, z|x̂) ≡
∑
x
µY Z|X(y, z|x)µX|X̂(x|x̂)
with the input distribution µ
X̂
, we construct a code for the channel µY Z|X as
ϕ(m,w) ≡ F (g
ABB̂
(c,m,w))
ϕ−1(y) ≡ BgA(c|y),
where g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) outputs the channel input x̂ ≡ (x̂1, . . . , x̂n) ∈ X̂n of outer channel µY Z|X̂ , F is defined
as
F (x̂) ≡ (F (x̂1), . . . , F (x̂n)),
and gA(c|y) reproduces x̂ with small error probability. Then the rate of this code is close to the secrecy capacity
of the channel µY Z|X defined by (10).
V. UNIVERSAL WIRETAP CHANNEL CODING
In this section we consider the fixed-rate universal wiretap channel coding for any stationary memoryless
channel µY Z|X , where an input distribution µX is given and it is enough to know the upper bound of H(X |Y )
and the lower bound of I(X ;Z) before constructing the code. It should be noted here that we have to know
the sizes of X , Y , and Z in advance.
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For a given RA, RB > 0, let pA and pB be ensembles of functions
A : Xn → X lA
B : Xn → X lB
B̂ : Xn → X lB̂
satisfying
RA =
log |ImA|
n
RB =
log |ImB|
n
RB̂ =
log |ImB̂|
n
,
respectively. It should be noted that ImB represents the set of all messages, RB represents the encoding rate
of a confidential message.
We fix functions A, B, B̂, and a vector c ∈ X lA available for an encoder, a decoder, and an eavesdropper.
We construct a stochastic encoder and assume that the encoder uses a random sequence w ∈ X lB̂ , which is
generated uniformly at random and independently of the channel and the message m ∈ X lB . We define the
same encoder and decoder as defined in the last section except to replace and gA by g˜A defined by (3).
Let M and W be random variables corresponding to m and w, respectively, where the probability distribu-
tions pM and pW are given by (14) and (15), respectively. The decoding error probability ErrorY |X(A,B, B̂, c)
and the information leakage LeakageZ|X(A,B, B̂, c) are given by (16) and (17), respectively.
We have the following theorem. It should be noted that alphabets X and Y is allowed to be non-binary, and
the channel is allowed to be asymmetric.
Theorem 2: For RA, RB, and RB̂, Assume that ensembles (A,pA), (A×B,pAB), and (A×B× B̂, pABB̂)
have a hash property. Let µX be the distribution of the channel input satisfying
RA +RB +RB̂ < H(X), (21)
where RB represents the encoding rate of a confidential message. Then for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large
n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B̂ ∈ B̂, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
ErrorY |X(A,B, B̂, c) < δ (22)
LeakageZ|X(A,B, B̂, c) < δ (23)
for any stationary memoryless channel µY Z|X satisfying
RA > H(X |Y ) (24)
RB̂ ≥ I(X ;Z). (25)
Remark 1: It should be noted that (21), (24), and (25) imply
0 < RA < H(X |Z)
0 < RB < I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z).
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VI. SECRET KEY AGREEMENT FROM CORRELATED SOURCE OUTPUTS
In this section we construct codes for secret key agreement from the correlated source outputs (X,Y, Z)
introduced in [12] (see Fig. 2), where a sender, a receiver, and an eavesdropper have access to X , Y , and Z ,
respectively. The secret key capacity, which represents the optimal key generation rate, is given in [17] as
Capacity = sup
n,t,(Ct
1
,X̂,Ŷ )
1
n
[
I(X̂ ; Ŷ )− I(X̂;Z,Ct1)
]
, (26)
where the supremum is taken over all n, t, and protocols (Ct1, X̂, Ŷ ) satisfying Markov conditions
Y nZnCti+1X̂Ŷ ↔ XnCi−11 ↔ Ci, if i is odd
XnZnCti+1X̂Ŷ ↔ Y nCi−11 ↔ Ci, if i is even
Y nZnŶ ↔ XnCt1 ↔ X̂
XnZnŶ ↔ Y nCt1 ↔ Ŷ
in which Ct1 represents the communication between the sender and the receiver via a public channel and finally
the sender and the receiver generate X̂ and Ŷ , respectively. It should be noted that X̂ 6= Ŷ is allowed with
high probability. According to [3][4], there are three steps in a secret key agreement: advantage distillation,
information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. This section deals with the combination of information
reconciliation and privacy amplification studied in [1][4][15][16]. In the following, we assume that a fixed joint
distribution µXY Z satisfies
I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z) = H(X |Z)−H(X |Y ) > 0
and do not deal with advantage distillation. From (26), we can construct a protocol whose rate is close to the
secret key capacity by combining an advantage distillation protocol (Ct1, X̂, Ŷ ) with the following one-way
secret key agreement protocol, where I(X̂; Ŷ )− I(X̂;Z,Ct1) is close to the secret key capacity.
In the following, we focus on the one way secret key agreement protocol. When secret key agreement is
allowed to be one-way from the sender to the receiver, the forward secret key capacity is given in [1] by
Capacity = max
C,X̂
[
I(X̂ ;Y |C)− I(X̂ ;Z|C)
]
, (27)
where the maximum is taken over all random variables C and X̂ that satisfy the Markov condition
X̂ ←→ C ←→ X ←→ Y Z.
Since
I(X̂;Y |C)− I(X̂ ;Z|C) = I(X̂;Y,C)− I(X̂;Z,C),
then we can construct an optimal one-way secret key agreement protocol by applying the following protocol
to the correlated source (X̂, (Y,C), (Z,C)), which achieves the maximum on the right hand side of (27).
The following construction is based on [16]. We fix functions
A : Xn → X lA
B : Xn → X lB
November 4, 2018 DRAFT
12
Encoder
x
✲
✲
A
B
c
m
✲
✲
Decoder
c ✲
y ✲
gA ✲ x ✲ B ✲ m
Fig. 4. Construction of One-way Secret Key Agreement Protocol
available for an encoder, a decoder, and an eavesdropper, where
lA ≡ n[H(X |Y ) + εA]
log |X |
lB ≡ n[H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )]
log |X |
=
n[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]
log |X | .
Then a secret key agreement protocol is described below (see Fig. 4).
Encoding: Let x ∈ Xn be a sender’s random sequence. The sender transmits c to a legitimate receiver
via a public channel and generates a secret key by m, where c and m are defined as
c ≡ Ax (28)
m ≡ Bx, (29)
respectively.
Decoding: Let y ∈ Yn be a receiver’s random sequence, and c ≡ Ax be a codeword received from the
sender via a public channel. The receiver generates a secret key by BgA(c|y), where gA is defined by (2).
Let C and M be random variables corresponding to c and m defined by (28) and (29), respectively. The
key generation rate is given by
Rate ≡ H(M)
n
. (30)
The error probability of the secret key agreement is given by
ErrorXY (A,B) ≡ µXY ({(x,y) : BgA(Ax,y) 6= Bx}) . (31)
The information leakage is given by
LeakageXY Z(A,B) ≡
I(M ;Zn, C)
n
. (32)
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We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3: For given lA and lB, assume that ensembles (A,pA) and (A×B,pAB) have a hash property.
For all δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are εA > 0 and functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ B and B ∈ B
such that the above secret key agreement protocol satisfies
Rate > I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)− δ (33)
ErrorXY (A,B) < δ (34)
LeakageXY Z(A,B) < δ. (35)
By assuming that random variables C and X̂ attain the forward secret key capacity given by (27) and the
sender sends message C via public channel before the protocol, the rate of the proposed secret key agreement
protocol for correlated sources (X̂, (Y,C), (Z,C)) is closed to the forward secret key capacity.
VII. UNIVERSAL SECRET KEY AGREEMENT FROM CORRELATED SOURCE OUTPUTS
In this section, we construct a fixed-rate universal secret key agreement scheme for any stationary memoryless
sources (X,Y, Z), where it is enough to know the upper bound of H(X |Y ) and the lower bound of H(X |Z)
before constructing the code. It should be noted here that we have to know the sizes of X , Y , and Z in advance.
For a given RA, RB > 0, let pA and pB be ensembles of functions
A : Xn → X lA
B : Xn → X lB ,
where
lA ≡ nRA
log |X |
lB ≡ nRB
log |X | .
We use the same secret key agreement protocol as that described in the last section except that we replace
gA by g˜A defined by (3).
The key generation rate Rate, the error probability ErrorXY (A,B), and the information leakage Leakage(A,B)
are defined by (30), (31), and (32), respectively.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 4: For given RA and RB , assume that ensembles (A,pA) and (A×B,pAB) have a hash property.
For all δ > 0 and sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A and B ∈ B such that the
above secret key agreement scheme satisfies
Rate > RB − δ (36)
ErrorXY (A,B) < δ (37)
LeakageXY Z(A,B) < δ. (38)
for any stationary memoryless source (X,Y, Z) satisfying
RA > H(X |Y ) (39)
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RA +RB ≤ H(X |Z). (40)
Remark 2: It should be noted that (39) and (40) imply
0 < RA < H(X |Z)
0 < RB < I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z).
VIII. APPLYING LINEAR PROGRAMMING METHOD TO MINIMUM-DIVERGENCE ENCODER,
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD DECODER, AND MINIMUM-ENTROPY DECODER
In this section, we apply the linear programming method introduced by [9][5] by assuming that X = Y =
GF(2) and A, B, and B̂ are linear functions (sparse matrices). It should be noted again that this method may
not find integral solutions and we do not discuss the performance of the linear programming methods in this
paper.
First, we construct the minimum-divergence encoder g
ABB̂
defined by (1). The following construction is
presented in [19]. We use the fact that the analysis of error probability in the proof of theorems is not changed
if we replace the minimum-divergence encoder g
ABB̂
by
g′
ABB̂
(c,m,w) ≡

x′ if x′ ∈ C
ABB̂
(c,m,w) ∩ TU exists,
‘error’ otherwise,
where U is defined by (76) which appears in Appendix C. Let
t ≡ arg min
t′∈{0,1,...,n}
D(νt′‖µX), (41)
where (νt(0), νt(1)) ≡ (1− t/n, t/n). Then the function g′
ABB̂
is realized by finding x′ that satisfies Ax′ = c,
Bx′ = m, B̂x′ = w, and
∑n
i=1 x
′
i = t and declaring the encoding error if there is no such x′ that satisfies
Ax′ = c, Bx′ = m, B̂x′ = w, and
∑n
i=1 x
′
i = t, where we consider x′ as a real-valued vector in the
third condition. It should be noted that it is realized by the linear programming method because the conditions
Ax′ = c, Bx′ =m, B̂x′ = w can be represented by linear inequalities by using the technique of [9].
Next, we construct the maximum-likelihood decoder gA defined by (2). The following construction is
equivalent to [9]. The function gA is realized by
gA(c|y) ≡

arg min
x′:Ax′=c
n∑
i=1
x′i, if 0 ≤ µX|Y (1|0), µX|Y (1|1) ≤ 1/2
arg min
x′:Ax′=c
n∑
i=1
[−1]yix′i, if 0 ≤ µX|Y (1|0), µX|Y (0|1) ≤ 1/2
arg max
x′:Ax′=c
n∑
i=1
[−1]yix′i, if 0 ≤ µX|Y (0|0), µX|Y (1|1) ≤ 1/2
arg max
x′:Ax′=c
n∑
i=1
x′i, if 0 ≤ µX|Y (0|0), µX|Y (0|1) ≤ 1/2,
where x′ and y are considered as real-valued vectors in
∑n
i=1 x
′
i and
∑n
i=1[−1]yix′i. The above minimizations
and maximizations are the linear programming problems because the condition Ax′ = c can be represented by
linear inequalities by using the technique of [9].
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Finally, we construct the minimum-entropy decoder g˜A defined by (3). The following construction is presented
in [19], which is based on the idea presented in [5]. The function g˜A can be realized as
xt,min ≡ arg min
x
′:
Ax′=c∑n
i=1 x
′
i=t
n∑
i=1
yix
′
i (42)
xt,max ≡ arg max
x
′:
Ax′=c∑n
i=1 x
′
i=t
n∑
i=1
yix
′
i (43)
g˜A(c|y) ≡ arg min
x′∈∪nt=0{xt,min,xt,max}
H(x′|y), (44)
where x′ and y are considered as real-valued vectors in
∑n
i=1 x
′
i and
∑n
i=1 yix
′
i. The derivation of (44) is
presented in [19, Appendix A]. We can use the linear programming method to obtain xt,min and xt,max because
the constraint Ax′ = c can be represented by linear inequalities by using the technique introduced in [9]. It
should be noted that gA can be replaced by
g′A(c|y) ≡ arg min
x′∈CA(c)∩TU
H(x′|y)
= arg min
x′∈{xt,min,xt,max}
H(x′|y) (45)
by assuming that U defined by (76) or t defined by (41) is shared by the encoder and the decoder, where xt,min
and xt,max are defined by (42) and (43), respectively.
IX. PROOF OF THEOREMS
A. Proof of Theorem 1
We use the following lemma which is proved in Appendix.
Lemma 4: Let gAB(c,m|z) be defined as
gAB(c,m|z) ≡ arg max
x′∈CAB(c,m)
µX|Z(x
′|z).
Then, for all δ′ > 0, all sufficiently small γ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse
matrices) A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B̂ ∈ B̂, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
pMWY Z


(m,w,y, z) :
g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z /∈ TZ|X,γ(gABB̂(c,m,w))
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gAB(c,m|z)
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gA(c|y)


≤ δ′. (46)
Now we prove Theorem 1. The equality (18) has already been shown. Since g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) = gA(c|y)
implies
ϕ−1(y) = BgA(c|y)
= Bg
ABB̂
(c,m,w)
=m
for all c and w, the inequality (19) comes immediately from Lemma 4 by letting δ′ < δ.
November 4, 2018 DRAFT
16
In the following we prove (20). From Lemma 4 and Fano’s inequality, we have
H(g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )|Zn,M) ≤ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X | (47)
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8).
Let x˜ ≡ g
ABB̂
(c,m,w), X˜n ≡ g
ABB̂
(c,M,W ) and X˜ be defined as
X˜ ≡ {g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) :m ∈ X lB ,w ∈ X lB̂} .
Then the probability distribution P
X˜Z
is given by
P
X˜Z
(x˜, z) =
∑
m,w:
x˜=g
ABB̂
(c,m,w)
µZ|X(z|x˜)PM (m)PW (w),
=

µZ|X (z|x˜)
|ImB||ImB̂|
, if x˜ ∈ X˜ ,m ∈ ImB,w ∈ ImB̂
0, otherwise
(48)
where the summation equals zero when x˜ /∈ X˜ and the second equality comes from the fact that if x˜ ∈ X˜ then
there is a unique pair (m,w) such that x˜ = g
ABB̂
(c,m,w). From Lemma 15, we have
µZ|X(z|x) ≤ 2−n[H(Z|X)−ζZ|X (γ|γ)] (49)
for x ∈ TX,γ and z ∈ TZ|X,γ(x). Then the joint entropy H(X˜n, Zn) is given by
H(X˜n, Zn) ≥
∑
x˜∈TX,γ
∑
z∈TZ|X,γ(x˜)
P
X˜Z
(x˜, z) log
1
P
X˜,Z
(x˜, z)
≥
∑
x˜∈TX,γ
∑
z∈TZ|X,γ(x˜)
P
X˜Z
(x˜, z)
[
n[H(Z|X)− ζZ|X (γ|γ)] + log |ImB||ImB̂|
]
≥ n[1− δ′]
[
H(Z|X) + 1
n
log |ImB||ImB̂| − ζZ|X (γ|γ)
]
≥ n[H(Z|X) + I(X ;Y )]− log |X |
lB+lB̂
|ImB||ImB̂|
− n [δ′ log |X ||Z|+ ζZ|X (γ|γ) + εB̂] (50)
for sufficiently large n, where the second inequality comes from (48) and (49), and the third inequality comes
from Lemma 4. Then we have
I(M ;Zn) = H(M) +H(Zn)−H(Zn,M)
= H(M) +H(Zn)−H(Zn,M, g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) +H(g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )|Zn,M)
= H(M) +H(Zn)−H(Zn, g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) +H(g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )|Zn,M)
≤ H(M) +H(Zn)−H(Zn, g
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ n[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] +H(Zn)− n[H(Z|X) + I(X ;Y )] + log |X |
lB+lB̂
|ImB||ImB̂|
+ n
[
δ′ log |X ||Z|+ ζZ|X (γ|γ) + εB̂
]
+ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
< nδ (51)
for sufficiently large n, where the third equality comes from the fact that Bg(c,M,W ) = M , the first inequality
comes from (47), the second inequality comes from (50), and we choose suitable εB̂, γ, δ′ > 0 to satisfy the
last inequality. From this inequality we have (20).
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B. Proof of Theorem 2
We use the following lemmas, which are proved in Appendix.
Lemma 5: If I(X ;Z) ≤ R, then for all ε > 0 there is a random variable Z˜ taking values in Z˜ ≡ X × Z
and a function f such that
I(X ; Z˜) = R+ ε
Z = f(Z˜).
Lemma 6: Let g˜AB(c,m|z˜) be defined as
g˜AB(c,m|z˜) ≡ arg min
x′∈CAB(c,m)
H(x′|z˜).
Then, for all δ′ > 0, all sufficiently small γ > 0, and sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices)
A ∈ A, B ∈ B, B̂ ∈ B̂, and a vector c ∈ ImA such that
p
MWY Z˜


(m,w,y, z˜) :
g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z˜ /∈ T
Z˜|X,γ(g˜ABB̂(c,m,w))
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜A(c|y)
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜AB(c,m|z˜)


≤ δ′ (52)
for any µ
Y Z˜|X satisfying
RA +RB +RB̂ < H(X) (53)
RA > H(X |Y ) (54)
RA +RB > H(X |Z˜). (55)
Now we prove Theorem 2. The inequality (22) is shown similarly to the proof of (19).
In the following we prove (23). From Lemma 5, there is Z˜ ∈ Z˜ such that
I(X ; Z˜) = RB̂ + ε, (56)
where ε > 0 is specified later. From Lemma 6 and Fano’s inequality, we have
H(g˜
ABB̂
(c,M,W )|Z˜n,M) ≤ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X | (57)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8). Similarly to the proof of (50), we have
H(Z˜n, g˜
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) ≥ n[1− δ′]
[
H(Z˜|X) + 1
n
log |ImB||ImB̂| − ζZ˜|X (γ|γ)
]
≥ nH(Z˜|X) + log |ImB||ImB̂| − n
[
δ′ log |X ||Z˜|+ ζZ˜|X (γ|γ)
]
≥ n[H(Z˜|X) +RB +RB̂]− n
[
δ′ log |X ||Z˜|+ ζZ˜|X (γ|γ)
]
, (58)
where the second inequality comes from the fact that RB +RB̂ < H(X) ≤ log |X |. Then we have
I(M ;Zn) = I(M ; f(Z˜1), . . . , f(Z˜n))
≤ I(M ; Z˜n)
= H(M) +H(Z˜n)−H(Z˜n,M, g˜
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) +H(g˜
ABB̂
(c,M,W )|Z˜n,M)
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≤ H(M) +H(Z˜n)−H(Z˜n, g˜
ABB̂
(c,M,W )) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ nRB +H(Z˜n)− n[H(Z˜|X) +RB +RB̂] + n
[
δ′ log |X ||Z˜|+ ζZ|X (γ|γ)
]
+ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ n[I(X ; Z˜)−RB̂] + n
[
δ′ log |X ||Z˜ |+ ζZ|X (γ|γ)
]
+ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ n
[
ε+ δ′ log |X |2|Z˜|+ ζZ|X (γ|γ)
]
+ h(δ′)
< nδ (59)
where the second inequality comes from (57) and M = Bg
ABB̂
(c,M,W ), the third inequality comes from
(58), the fifth inequality comes from (56), and we choose a suitable γ > 0, a suitable ε > 0, and a suitable
δ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (23).
C. Proof of Theorem 3
We use the following lemma which is proved in Appendix.
Lemma 7: Let gAB(c,m|z) be defined as
gAB(c,m|z) ≡ arg max
x′∈CAB(c,m)
µX|Z(x
′|z).
Then, for any δ′ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A and B ∈ B such
that
pXY Z

(x,y, z) :
gA(Ax|y) 6= x
or gAB(Ax, Bx|z) 6= x

 ≤ δ′. (60)
Now we prove Theorem 3.
First, we prove (34). Since gA(Ax|y) = x implies BgA(Ax|y) = Bx, then the inequality (34) comes
immediately from Lemma 7 by letting δ′ < δ.
Next, we prove (35). From Lemma 7 and Fano’s inequality, we have
H(Xn|Zn, C,M) ≤ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8). This implies that
H(Zn, C,M) ≥ H(Xn, Zn, C,M)− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X |
= H(Xn, Zn)− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X | (61)
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where the equality comes from the definitions (28) and (29) of C and
M . Then we have
I(M ;Zn, C) = H(Zn, C) +H(M)−H(Zn, C,M)
≤ H(Zn) +H(C) +H(M)−H(Zn, C,M)
≤ H(Zn) +H(C) +H(M)−H(Xn, Zn) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ H(Zn) + n[H(X |Y ) + εA] + n[H(X |Z)−H(X |Y )]−H(Xn, Zn) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
= nεA + h(δ
′) + nδ′ log |X |
< nδ, (62)
November 4, 2018 DRAFT
19
where the second inequality comes from (61), the third inequality comes from the definitions (28) and (29)
of C and M , and we choose a suitable εA > 0 and a suitable δ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this
inequality we have (35).
Finally, we prove (33). We have
H(M) = H(M) +H(Zn, C)−H(Zn, C)
≥ H(Zn, C,M)−H(Zn)−H(C)
≥ H(Xn, Zn)− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X | −H(Zn)− n[H(X |Y ) + εA]
= n[I(X ;Z)− I(X ;Y )]− nεA − h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X |
≥ n[I(X ;Z)− I(X ;Y )]− nδ, (63)
where the second inequality comes from (61), and we choose a suitable εA > 0 and a suitable δ′ > 0 to satisfy
the last inequality. From this inequality we have (33).
D. Proof of Theorem 4
We use the following lemmas which are proved in Appendix.
Lemma 8: If H(X |Z) ≥ R, then for all ε > 0 there is a random variable Z˜ taking values in Z˜ ≡ X × Z
and a function f such that
H(X |Z˜) = R − ε
Z = f(Z˜).
Lemma 9: Let g˜AB(c,m|z˜) be defined as
g˜AB(c,m|z˜) ≡ arg min
x′∈CAB(c,m)
H(x′|z˜).
Then, for any δ′ > 0, and all sufficiently large n, there are functions (sparse matrices) A ∈ A and B ∈ B such
that
p
XY Z˜

(x,y, z˜) :
gA(Ax|y) 6= x
or gAB(Ax, Bx|z˜) 6= x

 ≤ δ′ (64)
for any µ
XY Z˜
satisfying
RA > H(X |Y ) (65)
RA +RB > H(X |Z˜). (66)
Now we prove Theorem 4. In the following, we prove (38) and (36). The proof of (37) is similar to that of
(64).
First, from Lemma 8 and (66), there is Z˜ ∈ Z˜ such that
H(X |Z˜) = RA +RB − ε, (67)
November 4, 2018 DRAFT
20
where ε > 0 is specified later. From Lemma 9 and Fano’s inequality, we have
H(Xn|Z˜n, C,M) ≤ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
for all δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where h is defined by (8). This implies that
H(Z˜n, C,M) ≥ H(Xn, Z˜n)− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X |. (68)
Next, we prove (38). We have
I(M ;Zn, C) = I(M ; f(Z˜1), . . . , f(Z˜n), C)
≤ I(M ; Z˜n, C)
≤ H(Z˜n) +H(C) +H(M)−H(Z˜n, C,M)
≤ H(Z˜n) +H(C) +H(M)−H(Xn, Z˜n) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
≤ H(Z˜n) + nRA + nRB −H(Xn, Z˜n) + h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
= nε+ h(δ′) + nδ′ log |X |
< nδ, (69)
where the third inequality comes from (68), the fourth inequality comes from the definitions (28) and (29) of
C and M , the second equality comes from (67) and we choose a suitable ε > 0 and a suitable δ′ > 0 to satisfy
the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (38).
Finally, we prove (36). We have
H(M) ≥ H(Z˜n, C,M)−H(Z˜n)−H(C)
≥ H(Xn, Z˜n)− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X | −H(Z˜n)− nRA
= nRB − nε− h(δ′)− nδ′ log |X |,
≥ nRB − nδ, (70)
where the second inequality comes from (68), the equality comes from (67), and we choose a suitable ε > 0
and a suitable δ′ > 0 to satisfy the last inequality. From this inequality, we have (36).
X. CONCLUSION
The constructions of codes for the wiretap channel and secret key agreement from correlated source outputs
were presented. The optimality, reliability, and security of the codes were proved and the universal reliability
and security were also proved. The proof of the theorems is based on the notion of a hash property for an
ensemble of functions. Since an ensemble of sparse matrices has a hash property, we can construct codes by
using sparse matrices and practical encoding and decoding methods are expected to be effective. We believe that
our construction can be applied to a quantum channel to realize a quantum cryptography. However, it should
be noted that the security criteria should be revised to the quantum version.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemmas
Before the proof of Lemmas 4 and 6, we prepare the following lemmas.
Lemma 10 ([18, Lemma 8]): For any A and u ∈ Un,
pC ({c : Au = c}) =
∑
c
pC(c)χ(Au = c) =
1
|ImA|
and for any u ∈ Un
EAC [χ(Au = c)] =
∑
A,c
pAC(A, c)χ(Au = c) =
1
|ImA| .
Lemma 11 ([18, Lemma 3]): If (A, pA) satisfies (H4), then
pAC

(A, c) :
G ∩ CA(c) 6= ∅
u ∈ CA(c)

 ≤ |G|αA|ImA|2 + βA|ImA|
for all G ⊂ Un and all u /∈ G.
Lemma 12: Assume that εB̂ > εA > 0. For βA satisfying limn→∞ βA(n) = 0 and any γ > 0, there is a
sequence κ ≡ {κ(n)}∞n=1 and T ⊂ TU ⊂ TX,γ such that
lim
n→∞
κ(n) =∞ (71)
lim
n→∞
κ(n)βA(n) = 0 (72)
lim
n→∞
log κ(n)
n
= 0 (73)
and
γ ≥ D(νU‖µX) (74)
κ ≤ |T ||ImA||ImB||ImB̂| ≤ 2κ (75)
for all sufficiently large n, where U is defined as
U ≡ argmin
U ′
D(νU ′‖µX). (76)
In the following, κ denotes κ(n).
Proof: Let
κ(n) ≡

nξ if βA(n) = o
(
n−ξ
)
, ξ > 0
1√
βA(n)
, otherwise
(77)
for every n. It is clear that κ satisfies (71) and (72). It is also clear that κ satisfies (73) when βA(n) = o
(
n−ξ
)
,
ξ > 0. If βA(n) is not o
(
n−ξ
)
, there is κ′ > 0 such that βA(n)nξ > κ′ and
log κ(n)
n
=
log 1
βA(n)
2n
≤ log
nξ
κ′
2n
=
ξ logn− log κ′
2n
(78)
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for all sufficiently large n. This implies that κ satisfies (73). The inequality (74) comes from Lemma 21. From
Lemma 21 and εB̂ > εA > 0, we have
RA +RB +RB̂ +
log κ
n
≤ H(U)− λX ≤ H(X) (79)
for all sufficiently large n. Then we have
|TX,γ | ≥ |TU |
≥ 2n[H(U)−λX ],
≥ κ2n[RA+RB+RB̂]
= κ|ImA||ImB||ImB̂| (80)
for all sufficiently large n, where the first inequality comes from (74). This implies that there is T ⊂ TU ⊂ TX,γ
such that
κ ≤ |T |
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
≤ 2κ (81)
for all sufficiently large n.
Remark 3: It should be noted that we can let ξ be arbitrarily large in (77) when βA(n) vanishes exponentially
fast. This parameter ξ affects the upper bound of (46) and (52).
B. Proof of Lemma 4
In the following, we assume that εA, εB̂, and γ > 0 satisfy
εB̂ > εA > max
{
ζX|Y(2γ|2γ), ζX|Z(2γ|2γ)
}
. (82)
Let κ ≡ {κ(n)}∞n=1 be a sequence satisfying (71)–(73), and U be defined by (76). Then (74) is satisfied for
all γ > 0 and all sufficiently large n. From Lemma 12, there is T ⊂ TU ⊂ TX,γ satisfying (75).
Let x an input of the channel, and y and z be the channel outputs of the receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively. Let m be a message and w be a random sequence. We define
• g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) ∈ T ⊂ TX,γ (W1)
• y ∈ TY |X,γ(gABB̂(c,m,w)) (W2)
• z ∈ TZ|X,γ(gABB̂(c,m,w)) (W3)
• gA(c|y) = gABB̂(c,m,w) (W4)
• gAB(c,m|z) = gABB̂(c,m,w). (W5)
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Then the left hand side of (46) is upper bounded by
pMWY Z


(m,w,y, z) :
g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z /∈ TZ|X,γ(gABB̂(c,m,w))
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gA(c|y)
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gAB(c,m|z)


≤ pMWY Z(Sc1) + pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2) + pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3) + pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S2 ∩ Sc4)
+ pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S3 ∩ Sc5),
(83)
where
Si ≡ {(m,w,y, z) : (Wi)} .
First, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(Sc1)]. From Lemma 2 and (81), we have
E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(Sc1)] = pABB̂CMW
({
(A,B, B̂, c,m,w) : g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) /∈ T
})
≤ p
ABB̂CMW
({
(A,B, B̂, c,m,w) : T ∩ C
ABB̂
(c,m,w) = ∅
})
≤ α
ABB̂
− 1 + |ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
[
β
ABB̂
+ 1
]
|T |
≤ α
ABB̂
− 1 + βABB̂ + 1
κ
≤ δ
′
5
(84)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where the last inequality comes from (71) and the properties (H2) and
(H3) of an ensemble (A×B × B̂,p
ABB̂
).
Next, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2)] and EABB̂C [pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3)]. From Lemma 16, we have
E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2)] ≤
δ′
5
(85)
E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3)] ≤
δ′
5
(86)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Next, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S2 ∩ Sc4)] and EABB̂C [pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S3 ∩ Sc5)]. In the following,
we assume that
• x ∈ T ⊂ TX,γ
• y ∈ TY |X,γ(x)
• gA(c|y) 6= x.
From Lemma 14, we have (x,y) ∈ TXY,2γ and x ∈ TX|Y,2γ(y). Then there is x′ ∈ CA(c) such that x′ 6= x
and
µX|Y (x
′|y) ≥ µX|Y (x|y)
≥ 2−n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)],
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where the second inequality comes from Lemma 16. This implies that [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(c) 6= ∅, where
G(y) ≡
{
x′ : µX|Y (x
′|y) ≥ 2−[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)]
}
.
Then we have
E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S2 ∩ Sc4)]
≤ E
ABB̂CMW
∑
x∈T
χ(g
ABB̂
(C,M,W ) = x)
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)

≤ E
ABB̂CMW
∑
x∈T
χ(Ax = C)χ(Bx = M)χ(B̂x = W )
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)

=
∑
x∈T
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)EAC
[
χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)χ(Ax = C)EBB̂MW
[
χ(Bx = M)χ(B̂x = W )
]]
=
1
|ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)EAC [χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)χ(Ax = C)]
≤ 1
|ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)pAC

(A, c) :
[G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(c) 6= ∅
x ∈ CA(c)


≤ 1
|ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
∑
y∈TY |X,γ (x)
µY |X(y|x)
[
2n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)]αA
|ImA|2 +
βA
|ImA|
]
≤
[
2n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)]αA
|ImA| + βA
]∑
x∈T
1
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
≤ 2κ|X |
lA2−n[εA−ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)]αA
|ImA| + 2κβA
≤ δ
′
5
(87)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n, where the second inequality comes from Lemma 10, the fourth inequality
comes from Lemma 11 and the fact that
|G(y)| ≤ 2n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (2γ|2γ)],
the sixth inequality comes from (81), and the last inequality comes from (72), (82) and the properties (H1)–(H3)
of an ensemble (A,pA). Similarly, we have
E
ABB̂C
[pMWY Z(S1 ∩ S3 ∩ Sc5)] ≤
2κ|X |lA+lB2−n[εA−ζX|Z (2γ|2γ)]αAB
|ImA||ImB| + 2κβAB
≤ δ
′
5
(88)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Finally, from (83)–(88), we have the fact that for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n there are A ∈ A, B ∈ B,
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B̂ ∈ B̂, and c ∈ ImA such that
pMWY Z


(m,w,y, z) :
g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z /∈ TZ|X,γ(gABB̂(c,m,w))
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gA(c|y)
or g
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= gAB(c,m|z)


≤ δ′.
C. Proof of Lemma 5
The following proof is based on [16, Lemma 1]. If there is a random variable X ′ taking values in X such
that
H(X |X ′, Z) = R′ (89)
for given (X,Z) and 0 ≤ R′ ≤ H(X |Z) the lemma is proved by letting
R′ ≡ H(X)−R − ε ≤ H(X |Z)
Z˜ ≡ (X ′, Z)
f(z˜) ≡ z for z˜ = (x′, z)
because
I(X ; Z˜) = H(X)−H(X |Z˜)
= H(X)−R′
= R+ ε. (90)
The following proves the existence of X ′ satisfying (89). It is clear that 0 ≤ H(X |X ′, Z) ≤ H(X |Z) for any
(X,X ′, Z), H(X |X ′, Z) = H(X |Z) when X ′ is independent of (X,Z), and H(X |X ′, Z) = 0 when X ′ = X .
Since H(X |X ′, Z) is a continuous function of the conditional distribution pX′|XZ , we have the existence of
pX′|XZ satisfying H(X |X ′, Z) = R′ from the intermediate value theorem, where pXX′Z is given by
pXX′Z(x, x
′, v) ≡ µXZ(x, z)pX′|XZ(x′|x, z)
for (x, x′, z) ∈ X × X × Z . 
D. Proof of Lemma 6
Let κ ≡ {κ(n)}∞n=1 be a sequence satisfying (71)–(73). Let U be defined by (76). Then (74) is satisfied for
all γ > 0 and all sufficiently large n. From Lemma 12, there is T ⊂ TU ⊂ TX,γ satisfying (75).
We define
• g˜AB(c,m,w) ∈ T ⊂ TU ⊂ TX,γ (UW1)
• z˜ /∈ T
Z˜|X,γ(g˜ABB̂(c,m,w)) (UW2)
• g˜A(c|y) = g˜ABB̂(c,m,w) (UW3)
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• g˜AB(c,m|z˜) = g˜ABB̂(c,m,w), (UW4)
where we assume that n is large enough to satisfy T
Z˜|X,γ(x) 6= ∅ for all x ∈ TX,γ . Then the left hand side of
(22) is upper bounded by
p
MWY Z˜


(m,w,y, z˜) :
g˜AB(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z˜ /∈ T
Z˜|X,γ(g˜ABB̂(c,m,w))
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜A(c|y)
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜AB(c,m|z˜)


≤ p
MWY Z˜
(Sc1) + pMWY Z˜(S1 ∩ Sc2) + pMWY Z˜(S1 ∩ Sc3) + pMWY Z˜(S1 ∩ Sc4),
(91)
where
Si ≡ {(m,w,y, z˜) : (UWi)} .
First, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(Sc1)
]
. Similarly to the proof of (84), we have
E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(Sc1)
] ≤ α
ABB̂
− 1 + βABB̂ + 1
κ
. (92)
Next, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(S1 ∩ Sc2)
]
. From Lemma 16, we have
E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(S1 ∩ Sc2)
] ≤ 2−n[γ−λXZ˜ ]. (93)
Next, we evaluate E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(S1 ∩ Sc3)
]
. Let
G(y) ≡ {x′ : H(x′|y) ≤ H(U |V )}
and assume that (x,y) ∈ TUV . Then we have
EAC [χ(Ax = C)χ(g˜A(C|y) 6= x)] = pAC

(A, c) :
Ax = c
∃x′ 6= x s.t.
H(x′|y) ≤ H(x|y) and Ax′ = c


= pA

A :
∃x′ 6= x s.t.
H(x′|y) ≤ H(x|y) and Ax′ = Ax

 pC ({c : Ax = c})
=
1
|ImA|pA

A :
∃x′ 6= x s.t. H(x′|y) ≤ H(U |V )
and Ax′ = Ax


≤ 1|ImA| max
 ∑
x′∈G(y)\{x}
pA ({A : Ax = Ax′}) , 1

≤ 1|ImA| max
{
2n[H(U|V )+λXY ]αA
|ImA| + βA, 1
}
=
1
|ImA| max
{
2−n[RA−H(U|V )−λXY ]αA + βA, 1
}
≤ 1|ImA|
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA
]
, (94)
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where | · |+ is defined by (9), the third equality comes from Lemma 10, and the second inequality comes from
Lemma 20 and the property (H4) of (A, pA). Let
FY |X(R) ≡ min
V |U
[
D(νV |U‖µY |X |νU ) + |R−H(U |V )|+
]
,
where V |U denotes the conditional type given type U . Then we have
E
ABB̂C
[
p
MWY Z˜
(S1 ∩ Sc3)
]
≤ E
ABB̂CMW
[∑
x∈T
∑
y
µY |X(y|x)χ(gAB(c,m,w) = x)χ(g˜A(c|y) 6= x)
]
= E
ABB̂CMW
∑
x∈T
∑
V |U
∑
y∈TV |U (x)
µY |X(y|x)χ(g˜AB(C,M) = x)χ(g˜A(C|y) 6= x)

≤ E
ABB̂CMW
∑
x∈T
∑
V |U
∑
y∈TV |U (x)
µY |X(y|x)χ(Ax = C)χ(Bx = M)χ(B̂x = W )χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)

=
∑
x∈T
∑
V |U
∑
y∈TV |U (x)
µY |X(y|x)EAC [χ(Ax = C)χ(gA(C|y) 6= x)]EBB̂MW
[
χ(Bx = M)χ(B̂x = W )
]
≤ 1
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
∑
V |U
∑
y∈TV |U (x)
µY |X(y|x)
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA
]
=
1
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
max {αA, 1}∑
V |U
∑
y∈TV |U (x)
µY |X(y|x)2−n[|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA

≤ 1
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
∑
x∈T
max {αA, 1}∑
V |U
2−n[D(νV |U‖µY |X |νU )+|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA

≤ |T |
|ImA||ImB||ImB̂|
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[FY |X(RA)−2λXY ] + βA
]
≤ 2κ
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[FY |X (RA)−2λXY ] + βA
]
, (95)
where the third inequality comes from Lemma 10 and (94), the fourth inequality comes from Lemmas 13
and 19, the fifth inequality comes from the definition of FY |X and Lemma 18, and the last inequality comes
from (81). Similarly, we have
EABC
[
p
MWY Z˜
(S1 ∩ Sc4)
] ≤ 2κ [max {αAB, 1} 2−n[FZ˜|X (RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ] + βAB] , (96)
where
F
Z˜|X(R) ≡ min
V ′|U
[
D(νV ′|U‖µZ˜|X |νU ) + |R−H(U |V ′)|+
]
.
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From (91)–(93), (95) and (96), we have
E
ABB̂C

p
MWY Z˜


(m,w,y, z˜) :
g˜AB(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z˜ /∈ T
Z˜|X,γ(g˜ABB̂(c,m,w))
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜A(c|y)
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜AB(c,m|z˜)



≤ α
ABB̂
− 1 + βABB̂ + 1
κ
+ 2−n[γ−λXZ˜ ] + 2κ
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[inf FY |X (RA)−2λXY ] + βA
]
+ 2κ
[
max {αAB , 1} 2−n[inf FZ˜|X(RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ] + βAB
]
,
where the infimum is taken over all µ
Y Z˜|X satisfying (53)–(55). This implies that there are A ∈ A, B ∈ B,
B̂ ∈ B̂, and c ∈ ImA such that
p
MWY Z˜


(m,w,y, z˜) :
g˜AB(c,m,w) /∈ TX,γ
or z˜ /∈ T
Z˜|X,γ(g˜ABB̂(c,m,w))
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜A(c|y)
or g˜
ABB̂
(c,m,w) 6= g˜AB(c,m|z˜)


≤ α
ABB̂
− 1 + βABB̂ + 1
κ
+ 2−n[γ−λXZ˜ ] + 2κ
[
max {αA, 1} 2−n[inf FY |X (RA)−2λXY ] + βA
]
+ 2κ
[
max {αAB , 1} 2−n[inf FZ˜|X(RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ] + βAB
]
.
(97)
Since
inf
µY |X :
H(Y |X)<RA
FY |X(RA) > 0
inf
µ
Z˜|X
:
H(Z˜|X)<RA+RB
F
Z˜|X(RA +RB) > 0,
then the right hand side of (97) goes to zero as n → ∞ by assuming (71)–(73) and the properties (H2) and
(H3) of ensembles (A,pA), (A×B,pAB) and (A×B × B̂,pABB̂).
E. Proof of Lemma 7
In the following, we assume that εA > 0 and γ > 0 satisfy
εA > max
{
ζX|Y(γ|γ), ζX|Z(γ|γ)
}
. (98)
Let x, y, and z be outputs of correlated sources. We define
• (x,y, z) ∈ TXY Z,γ (SKA1)
• gA(Ax|y) = x (SKA2)
• gAB(Ax, Bx|z) = x. (SKA3)
Then the left hand side of (34) is upper bounded by
pXY Z

(x,y, z) :
gAB(Ax|y) 6= x
or g
ABB̂
(Ax, Bx|z) 6= x

 ≤ pXY Z(Sc1) + pXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2) + pXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3),
(99)
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where
Si ≡ {(x,y, z) : (SKAi)} .
First, we evaluate EAB [pXY Z(Sc1)]. From (81), we have
EAB [pXY Z(Sc1)] ≤ 2−n[γ−λXYZ ]
≤ δ
′
3
(100)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Next, we evaluate EAB [pXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2)] and EAB [pXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3)]. From Lemma 14, we have (x,y) ∈
TXY,γ and x ∈ TX|Y,γ(y). Then there is x′ ∈ CA(Ax) such that x′ 6= x and
µX|Y (x
′|y) ≥ µX|Y (x|y)
≥ 2−n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (γ|γ)], (101)
where the second inequality comes from Lemma 16. This implies that [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(Ax) 6= ∅, where
G(y) ≡
{
x′ : µX|Y (x
′|y) ≥ 2−[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (γ|γ)]
}
.
Then we have
EAB [µXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc2)] ≤
∑
(x,y,z)∈TXYZ,γ
µXY Z(x,y, z)pA ({A : [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(Ax) 6= ∅})
≤
∑
(x,y,z)∈TXYZ,γ
µXY Z(x,y, z)
[ |G(y)|αA
|ImA| + βA
]
≤
∑
(x,y,z)∈TXYZ,γ
µXY Z(x,y, z)
[
2n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (γ|γ)]αA
|ImA| + βA
]
≤ |X |
lAαA
|ImA| 2
n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (γ|γ)]|X |−lA + βA
≤ |X |
lAαA
|ImA| 2
−n[εA−ζX|Y (γ|γ)] + βA
≤ δ
′
3
(102)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n by taking an appropriate γ > 0, where the second inequality comes from
Lemma 1 and the third inequality comes from the fact that
|G(y)| ≤ 2n[H(X|Y )+ζX|Y (γ|γ)],
the fifth inequality comes from the definition of lA, and the last inequality comes from (98) and the properties
(H1)–(H3) of an ensemble (A,pA). Similarly, we have
EAB [pXY Z(S1 ∩ Sc3)] ≤
|X |lA+lBαAB
|ImA||ImB| 2
−n[εA−ζX|Z (γ|γ)] + βAB
≤ δ
′
3
(103)
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
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Finally, from (99)–(103), we have the fact that for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n there are A ∈ A and
B ∈ B such that
pXY Z

(x,y, z) :
gA(Ax|y) 6= x
or gAB(Ax, Bx|z) 6= x

 ≤ δ′
for all δ′ > 0 and sufficiently large n.
Remark 4: It should be noted that the property (H2) of ensembles (A,pA) and (A×B,pAB) can be replaced
by
lim
n→∞
logαA(n)
n
= 1
lim
n→∞
logαAB(n)
n
= 1,
respectively. In particular, there are expurgated ensembles (A,pA) and (B,pB) of sparse matrices that have
an (αA,0)-hash property, where the condition (H2) for αA and αAB is replaced by the above respective
conditions (see [2]).
F. Proof of Lemma 8
It has already been proved in the proof of Lemma 5 that there is a random variable X ′ taking values in X
such that
H(X |X ′, Z) = R′
for given (X,Z) and 0 ≤ R′ ≤ H(X |Z). The lemma is proved by letting
R′ ≡ R− ε
Z˜ ≡ (X ′, Z)
f(z˜) ≡ z for z˜ = (x′, z).
G. Proof of Lemma 9
Let x, y, z˜ be outputs of the correlated sources. We define
• g˜A(Ax|y) = x (USKA1)
• g˜AB(Ax, Ax|z˜) = x. (USKA2)
Then the left hand side of (64) is upper bounded by
p
XY Z˜

(x,y, z˜) :
gAB(Ax|y) 6= x
or g
ABB̂
(Ax, Bx|z˜) 6= x

 ≤ pXY Z(Sc1) + pXY Z(cSc2), (104)
where
Si ≡ {(x,y, z˜) : (USKAi)} .
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In the following, we evaluate EAB
[
p
XY Z˜
(Sc1)
]
and EAB
[
p
XY Z˜
(Sc2)
]
. Let UV be the type of sequence
(x,y) ∈ Xn×Yn and V |U be the conditional type given type U . In the following, we assume that (x,y) ∈ TUV .
If g˜A(Ax|y) 6= x, then there is x′ ∈ CA(Ax) such that x′ 6= x and
H(x′|y) ≤ H(x|y) ≤ H(U |V ).
This implies that [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(Ax) 6= ∅, where
G(y) ≡ {x′ : H(x′|y) ≤ H(U |V )} .
Then we have
EAB [χ(g˜A(Ax|y) 6= x)] ≤ pA ({A : [G(y) \ {x}] ∩ CA(Ax) 6= ∅})
≤ max
{ |G(y)|αA
|ImA| + βA, 1
}
≤ max
{
2n[H(U|V )+λXY ]αA
|ImA| + βA, 1
}
≤ max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}
2−n[|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA, (105)
where | · |+ is defined by (9), the second inequality comes from Lemma 1, and the third inequality comes from
Lemma 20. Let
FXY (R) ≡ min
UV
[
D(νxy‖µXY ) + |R −H(U |V )|+
]
.
Then we have
EAB
[
µ
XY Z˜
(Sc1)
]
=
∑
UV
∑
(x,y)∈TUV
µXY (x,y)EAB [χ(g˜A(Ax|y) 6= x)]
≤
∑
UV
∑
(x,y)∈TUV
µXY (x,y)
[
max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}
2−n[|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA
]
≤ max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}∑
UV
2−n[D(νxy‖µXY )+|RA−H(U|V )|
+−λXY ] + βA
≤ max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}
2−n[FXY (RA)−2λXY ] + βA, (106)
where the first inequality comes from (105), the second inequality comes from Lemmas 13 and 19, and the
last inequality comes from Lemma 18 and the definition of FXY . Similarly, we have
EAB
[
p
XY Z˜
(Sc2)
] ≤ max{ |X |lA+lBαAB|ImA||ImB| , 1
}
2−n[FXZ˜(RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ] + βAB, (107)
where
F
XZ˜
(R) ≡ min
UV ′
[
D(νxz˜‖µXZ˜) + |R−H(U |V ′)|+
]
.
Finally, from (104), (106), and (107), we have
EAB
pXY Z˜

(x,y, z˜) :
gAB(Ax|y) 6= x
or g
ABB̂
(Ax, Bx|z˜) 6= x



≤ max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}
2−n[inf FXY (RA)−2λXY ] +max
{ |X |lA+lBαAB
|ImA||ImB| , 1
}
2−n[inf FXZ˜(RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ]
+ βA + βAB,
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where the infimum is taken over all µ
XY Z˜
satisfying (65) and (66). This implies that there are A ∈ A and
B ∈ B such that
p
XY Z˜

(x,y, z˜) :
gAB(Ax|y) 6= x
or g
ABB̂
(Ax, Bx|z˜) 6= x


≤ max
{ |X |lAαA
|ImA| , 1
}
2−n[inf FXY (RA)−2λXY ] +max
{ |X |lA+lBαAB
|ImA||ImB| , 1
}
2−n[inf FXZ˜(RA+RB)−2λXZ˜ ]
+ βA + βAB. (108)
Since
inf
µXY :
H(X|Y )<RA
FXY (RA) > 0
inf
µ
XZ˜
:
H(X|Z˜)<RA+RB
F
XZ˜
(RA +RB) > 0,
then the right hand side of (108) goes to zero as n → ∞ by assuming the properties (H1)–(H3) of (A,pA)
and (A×B,pAB).
H. Method of Types
We use the following lemmas for a set of typical sequences.
Lemma 13 ([6, Lemma 2.6][18, Lemma 21]):
1
n
log
1
µUV (u,v)
= H(νuv) +D(νuv‖µUV )
1
n
log
1
µU|V (u|v)
= H(νu|v|νv) +D(νu|v‖µU|V |νv).
Lemma 14 ([22, Theorem 2.5][18, Lemma 22]): If v ∈ TV,γ and u ∈ TU|V,γ′(v), then (u,v) ∈ TUV,γ+γ′ .
If (u,v) ∈ TUV,γ , then u ∈ TU,γ and u ∈ TU|V,γ(v).
Lemma 15 ([22, Theorem 2.7][18, Lemma 24]): Let 0 < γ ≤ 1/8. Then,∣∣∣∣ 1n log 1µU (u) −H(U)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζU (γ)
for all u ∈ TU,γ , and ∣∣∣∣ 1n log 1µU|V (u|v) −H(U |V )
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ζU|V(γ′|γ)
for v ∈ TV,γ and u ∈ TU|V,γ′(v), where ζU (γ) and ζU|V(γ′|γ) are defined in (5) and (6), respectively.
Lemma 16 ([22, Theorem 2.8][18, Lemma 25]): For any γ > 0 and v ∈ Vn,
µU ([TU,γ ]c) ≤ 2−n[γ−λU ]
µU|V ([TU|V,γ(v)]c|v) ≤ 2−n[γ−λUV ],
where λU and λUV are defined in (4).
Lemma 17 ([22, Theorem 2.9][18, Lemma 26]): For any γ > 0,∣∣∣∣ 1n log |TU,γ | −H(U)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηU (γ),
where ηU (γ) is defined in (7).
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Lemma 18 ([6, Lemma 2.2]): The number of different types of sequences in Un is fewer than [n + 1]|U|.
The number of conditional types of sequences in Un × Vn is fewer than [n+ 1]|U||V|.
Lemma 19 ([6, Lemma 2.3]): For a type U of a sequence in Xn,
2n[H(U)−λX ] ≤ |TU | ≤ 2nH(U),
where λX is defined in (4).
Lemma 20 ([19, Lemma 7][16, Lemma 2]): For y ∈ TV ,
| {x′ : H(x′) ≤ H(U)} | ≤ 2n[H(U)+λX ]
| {x′ : H(x′|y) ≤ H(U |V )} | ≤ 2n[H(U|V )+λXY ],
where λX and λXY are defined in (4).
Lemma 21 ([19, Lemma 7]): For any probability distribution µX on X ,
min
U
d(νU , µX) ≤ |X |
n
min
U
D(νU‖µX) ≤ |X |
nminx:µX (x)>0 µX(x)
min
U
|H(X)−H(U)| ≤ 2|X |
nminx:µX (x)>0 µX(x)
where minimum is taken over all types U of the sequence in Xn.
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